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Abstract
Model-free decentralized optimizations and learning are receiving increasing attention from the-
oretical and practical perspectives. In particular, two fully decentralized learning algorithms, namely
Trial and Error (TEL) and Optimal Dynamical Learning (ODL), are very appealing for a broad class
of games. In fact, ODL has the property to spend a high proportion of time in an optimum state that
maximizes the sum of utility of all players. And the TEL has the property to spend a high proportion
of time in an optimum state that maximizes the sum of utility of all players if there is a Pure Nash
Equilibrium (PNE), otherwise, it spends a high proportion of time in an optimum state that maximizes a
tradeoff between the sum of utility of all players and a predefined stability function. On the other hand,
estimating the mean fraction of time spent in the optimum state (as well as the mean time duration
to reach it) is challenging due to the high complexity and dimension of the inherent Markov Chains.
In this paper, under some specific system model, an evaluation of the above performance metrics is
provided by proposing an approximation of the considered Markov chains, which allows overcoming
the problem of high dimensionality. A comparison between the two algorithms is then performed which
allows a better understanding of their performances.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game Theory and more generally decentralized optimization has recently received increasing
attention from theoretical and practical perspectives. For instance, several classes of games have
been studied and characterization of the corresponding equilibria has been performed [1], [2]. On
another hand, developing learning based methods that can be implemented in a distributed way
by the agents is of paramount importance in decentralized optimization and game frameworks.
These methods must either converge to an equilibrium, in game contexts, or to a local/global
optimum in the context of decentralized optimization. One can refer to [1] for a survey on
learning based methods.
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2In most cases, it is assumed that the utility function of the users and action set have some
mathematical properties (e.g. Lipschitz continuity of the reward, etc.) to ensure the convergence
of developed methods.
In practice, the optimization/game frameworks can however very complex, in which the utility
function may not have a closed form expression and even may take discrete values. In such
contexts, model-free strategy learning algorithms are very appealing approaches [3]. Players
neither try to model the environment nor try to have a specific/explicit utility form. They simply
consider the environment as a black box and learn by interactions (e.g. trials and errors). This
context, though very restrictive, can be encountered in a wide variety of examples. For instance,
in a wind farm, each turbine controls the power that it extracts from the wind [4]. It is very
difficult, if not intractable, to model the impact of a turbine on other turbines. In addition, the
lack of communications between them makes impossible any cooperation. Another example is
the case of commuters in city that want to avoid traffic jams but, they neither know the strategies
of other commuters nor the impact of their strategy on the achieved rewards [5]. In the context
of wireless telecommunication systems, decentralized resource allocation can be encountered in
many contexts since the nodes/players may not be able to exchange information between each
other in order not to increase the overhead in the network. Also realistic utility functions of
the users may not have closed form expression (e.g. Quality of Experience, number of correctly
decoded packets; etc.). Decentralized resource allocation approaches have been used [6], [7] to
respectively share the resources among femtocells or wifi access points. In ad hoc networks,
the network is infrastructure-less which makes decentralized learning solutions suited in such
contexts [8], [9], [10], [11].
In model-free resource allocation schemes, developing decentralized strategies that converge
to an equilibrium (if it exists), or at least finding conditions under which they converge, represent
a main challenge [3]. The trial and error algorithms, proposed in [4], [12] and then applied to
various resource sharing problems e.g. [8], [9], [10], [11], are very appealing in these contexts.
They show the particularity to exhibit cooperative convergence properties in a broad class of
games. For this reason, the focus in this paper is on Trial and Errors algorithms. For instance,
Optimal Distributed Learning (ODL) algorithm from [4] has the property to spend a high
proportion of time in an optimum state that maximizes the sum of utility of all players whether
there is, or not, a Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE). On the other hand, Trial and Error Learning
(TEL) algorithm from [12] has the property to spend a high proportion of time in an optimum
3state that maximizes the sum of utility of all players if there is a PNE, otherwise, it spends
a high proportion of time in an optimum state that maximizes a tradeoff between the sum of
utility of all players and a predefined stability function. Even though the above two algorithms
converge to a desired state, the convergence rate remains an open question [3], [12]. The main
reason comes from the computation complexity of the inherent Markov Chain (MC) generated
by these two algorithms. In fact, the game in which players employ these learning schemes can
be represented by discrete MCs with huge number of states. Obtaining the transitions matrix
of these MCs is therefore not tractable which makes the analysis of the convergence rate not
possible (even numerically).
The main contributions of this work are fourfold. We are interested in computing the mean
time these algorithms spend in a desired state as well as the mean time required to achieve that
state under a given model. Due to the huge dimension of the MCs, only approximations can be
employed to compute a close approximation of the aforementioned convergence metrics. The
first contribution is to provide an approximation of the MC associated to the TEL algorithm. The
second contribution is to also provide such an approximation for ODL algorithm. In addition,
we explain the methodology to obtain them. To the best of our knowledge, a first attempt to
analyse the convergence rate of TEL in a practical context was addressed in [9]. However, the
analysis provided in this paper provides a better approximation (as one will see in the sequel).
In addition, no attempt has been made to analyse the convergence properties of ODL. Third,
with the numerical results, we derive the convergence properties of each algorithm. Last, this
allows us to provide a comparison between these two algorithms. To the best of our knowledge,
this comparison has not been addressed under a practical system model before.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model along with a brief
description of TEL and ODL. Section III summarizes the main results of this work. The detailed
analysis of the convergence (i.e. mean convergence time to a desired state and mean time spent
in that state), including the reduction of the MCs, is provided in sections IV, V, VI, and VII.
Numerical results are provided in Section VIII and Section IX concludes the paper.
II. MODEL
We consider a network/set of K players K = {1, . . . , K}, that interact among each other. The
players share a set of resources N = {r1, . . . , rN}. Each player k choose an action ak, which
consists of selecting without exchanging any information with the other players a resource inside
4the set N . The vector a = (a1, . . . , aK) ∈ A represents the system action, where A = NK . The
utility received by each player k ∈ K is uk(a), and u(a) = (u1(a), . . . , uk(a)) is the system
vector utility. When two players choose the same resource they will interference with each other.
We assume that the utility can take binary values (i.e. u ∈ {0, 1}K). Note that, such an hard
threshold utility model is commonly encountered in the literature [10], [8], [13]. This problem
can be modeled as a normal form game G = (K,A, {uk}k∈K). A common approach to solve the
aforementioned problem is to study the PNE that can be defined as follows.
Definition 1 (PNE): An action profile a∗ ∈ A is a PNE of game G if ∀k ∈ K and ∀ak ∈ N ,
uk(a
∗
k, a
∗
−k) ≥ uk(ak, a∗−k)
Since we consider a general game model, we make in the following some assumptions in order
to ensure the existence of a PNE. We suppose that the number of available resources N is greater
or equal to the number of players K. Furthermore, we assume that if two players interfere with
each other (i.e. choose the same resource) then their utilities are equal to 0. The utility of a player
is then equal to 1 when no other player choose the same resource. These simplified assumptions
can be justified by the fact that our objective in this paper is to study the performance of TEL
and ODL algorithms and not to study the existence of PNE for some game models. It is worth
mentioning that even under the above assumptions the problem is still challenging due to the fact
that the players cannot communicate with each other and then cannot be aware of the others’
actions and they can only observe the result of their own actions (e.g. a player cannot know
how many players have chosen the same resource). The resulting Markov chain, as one will see
in the sequel, is very complex to analyze under this model.
In order to deal with the aforementioned decentralized resource allocation problem, two fully
distributed learning schemes, namely TEL and ODL, can be employed. They have received
increasing attention recently, which leads us to analyze their performance and make a comparison
between them in this paper. In the remaining of this section, a description of these algorithms
is provided. Both algorithms share common characteristics. Each player k ∈ K implements a
controller composed with states called moods and noted mk and, m = (m1, . . . ,mK) is the
mood vector of the network. In TEL, there are four moods called Content (C), Watchful (W),
Hopeful (H) and Discontent (D), whereas ODL controller is solely composed with the two moods
C and D. Furthermore, each player has a benchmark action and a benchmark utility denoted
respectively by a¯k and u¯k. The benchmarks of the network are then denoted by a¯ = (a¯1, . . . , a¯K)
5and u¯ = (u¯1, . . . , u¯K). At each iteration, every player either selects to use the benchmark action
(i.e. ak = a¯k) or decides to try a new one ak 6= a¯k. Then, the player observes the obtained utility
uk and compares to its benchmark utility u¯k. Detailed descriptions of both algorithms, including
the rules used to define/update of the benchmark actions and utilities, are provided in the next
subsections.
A. TEL
This section described the rules applied in the TEL controller from [12] of any k ∈ K :
• mk = C, there are two cases to consider :
1) with probability 1 − , the player keeps playing its benchmark (i.e. ak = a¯k). The
next state changes to H if uk > u¯k or, it changes to W if uk < u¯k or, it remains C if
uk = u¯k.
2) with probability , the player experiments a new action, i.e. ak ∈ N\{a¯k}. The action
experimented is selected randomly among N\{a¯k} (i.e. Pr {ak = ri} = 1N−1 , ∀ri 6= a¯k)
and, the next state remains mk = C. When uk > u¯k, player k updates its benchmark
with probability G(uk−u¯k), where G(x) = −ν1x + ν2, with ν1 > 0 and ν2 such that 0 <
G(uk− u¯k) < 1/2. An update consists in changing the benchmark by the played action and
the received utility in the next iteration as follows, u¯k ← uk and a¯k ← ak.
• mk = H: ak = a¯k and the next state changes to C with a utility benchmark update ( i.e.
u¯k ← uk) if uk > u¯k or, it changes to W if uk < u¯k or, it changes to C if uk = u¯k.
• mk = W : ak = a¯k and the next state changes to H if uk > u¯k or, it changes to D if uk < u¯k
or, it changes to C if uk = u¯k.
• mk = D: an action ak is randomly selected among N (i.e. Pr {ak = ri} = 1N , ∀ri ∈ N )
with probability 1. The next state mk changes to C with probability F (uk), where F (u) =
−φ1u + φ2 with, φ1 > 0 and φ2 such that 0 < F (u) < 1/2K, with a benchmark update
(i.e. u¯k ← uk and a¯k ← ak), otherwise, with probability 1− F (uk), mk = D.
B. ODL
This section described the rules applied in the ODL controller from [4] of any player k ∈ K :
• mk = C, there are two cases to consider :
61) with probability 1 − c, where c > K is a real constant, ak = a¯k. If uk 6= u¯k then
the state mk changes to D with probability 1 − 1−uk . Otherwise, with probability 1−uk ,
the cluster updates its benchmark (i.e. u¯k ← uk ) and remains C.
2) with probability c > 0, a new action is experimented, ak ∈ N\{a¯k}. The new
action is selected randomly in the set N\{a¯k}. If uk 6= u¯k, the state mk changes to D with
probability 1− 1−uk . Otherwise, with probability 1−uk , the cluster updates its benchmark
(i.e. u¯k ← uk and a¯k ← ak) and remains in C.
• mk = D: an action ak is randomly chosen among N . The cluster switches to C with
probability 1−uk and updates its benchmark (i.e. u¯k ← uk and a¯k ← ak), otherwise with
probability 1− 1−uk , it remains D.
C. Markov chain representation and performance metrics
The different states taken by the network are defined by z = (m, a, a¯,u, u¯) and represent a
Markov chain ΞTEL if the TEL is used by all players or ΞODL if it is ODL. Unless there is an
ambiguity, we drop the indices and call the Markov chain Ξ.
The convergence performance of TEL and ODL is evaluated along two features: i) the
mean time duration to reach the state maximizing the social welfare, starting from a specific
initialization point, also known as Expected First Hitting Time (EFHT) and denoted by TEFHT ,
ii) the mean fraction of time duration spent on that state denoted by α.
It is of interest to note that these algorithms are known to converge under the interdependence
property (see [12], [4] for the exact definition). In few words, the interdependence is the property
that for any set of players, there exists an action that changes the utility of a player not in the
set. This condition is a sufficient condition as the analysis in [12], [4] was done for more general
game model than the one considered in this paper. In our case, the above condition is not needed.
In fact, thanks to the presence of the small probability  in TEL and ODL (see sections II-A and
II-B), all states of the Markov Chain Ξ communicate and form a unique communication class.
Ξ is then ergodic and possesses a unique invariant distribution. This property ensures a non null
transition probability between all states for a sufficient number of transitions and a non null
probability of the corresponding state. In this paper, we are interested in computing the mean
time the system stays in a desired state and the mean time needed to achieve that state for the
first time. The desired is the state that maximizes the social welfare of the players.
7III. RESULTS
The main result of this work is to provide an efficient approximation of the MC for TEL and
ODL algorithms that allow an accurate numerical convergence analysis. The approximated MC
is denoted by Ξ˜. In next sections, we describe the procedure to approximate and reduce the MC
dimensionality so as to realize the convergence analysis. It is worth mentioning that the number
of states in the original MC is huge, which makes very hard the computation (even numerically)
of the performance metrics TEFHT and α for both algorithms.
Using the proposed efficient approximation, we were able to find interesting results (that are
presented in VIII). Based on the obtained results, the following observations can be highlighted.
We use the Landau notation O(.) to specify the rate of convergence when K becomes important
or when  is close to 0 but strictly positive. In this notation, K and  are dropped for clarity.
Observation 1: For the TEL, the EFHT TEFHT = O( 1a1 ) and TEFHT = O(Ka2) where
a1, a2 > 0 and, 1− α = O(a3) and 1− α = O(Ka4) where a3, a4 > 0.
Observation 2: For the ODL, TEFHT = O( 1cb1 ) and TEFHT = O(bK2 ) where b1 > 0 ,b2 > 1
and, the stability is 1− α = O(b3) and α = O(bK4 ), where b3 > 0, 1 > b4 > 0.
From these observations some interesting comparisons can be deduced. Both algorithms have
a convergence time inversely proportional to  and a stability that decreases polynomially with
. However, ODL has a convergence time which is exponential with respect to K contrary to
TEL which is polynomial. At low K, the convergence time of ODL is relatively similar to
the TEL one, but at higher K, TEL converges faster than ODL. In addition, for ODL, the
stability decreases exponentially with respect to K whereas, for the TEL, the stability decreases
polynomially. It follows that the TEL is much more stable than the ODL. At low number of
players, the convergence time of both algorithms are similar but the stability of TEL is better.
At higher number of players, the TEL performs better than ODL for both convergence metrics.
These observations result from the analysis of numerical figures of merit computed using the
formulas presented in next section.
IV. METRICS COMPUTATION
In this section, we present how to compute the figure of merit of both algorithms using the
transition matrix P0 of Ξ. The method is based on the generalized fundamental matrix F for
8ergodic MC developed in [14]. The matrix F, which is an extension of the fundamental matrix
introduced in [15], is defined by
F := (I−P0 + 1bt)−1, (1)
where I is the identity matrix, 1 is a column vector filled with 1, and b is any arbitrary column
vector such that bt1 6= 0. During simulations, we use b = 1.
The first feature concerns the expected first hitting time to a given state j from a state i,
Ei [Tj] and is given by ([14] equation (30))
Ei [Tj] =
Fjj − Fij
pij
, (2)
where Fij is the term in line i and column j of matrix F, and pij is the stationary probability
of state j. The stationary distribution is given by the property that (equation (28) from [14])
btF = pi. (3)
The second feature that describes the performance of stochastic stable algorithms is the mean
fraction of time spent in the state that maximizes the social welfare. In an ergodic MC, the
proportion of time αj spent in a state j is equal to its stationary probability αj = pij ([15]
Theorem 4.2.1) that can be computed using (3).
The convergence analysis realization requires the manipulation of transitions matrices. The
huge number of states S grows exponentially with K and N (see Section VI-C) and since
Ξ’s transition matrix has dimension (S × S), it needs to be approximated to allow numerical
computation of the performance. As an example, even for small values N = K = 3, the
number of states is already S = 373, 248. In this work, we propose a new approach to build the
approximated Markov chain Ξ˜ whose transition matrix is noted P. Note that the approximation
Ξ˜ is built such that it is ergodic like Ξ which means that, P admits a unique invariant distribution
with strictly positive components. With this approximation, formulas (2) and (3) are still valid
if P0 is replaced by P. It remains to construct P with justified and motivated arguments. This
approach follows two steps: i) first we approximate the original Markov chain Ξ by identifying
some invariance induced by the utility model, ii) we then further reduce the Markov chain
complexity by neglecting some transitions. Then, from the probability transition matrix of the
approximated Markov chain, we are able to compute the two convergence figures of merit.
9V. REDUCING THE MARKOV CHAIN DIMENSIONALITY
In order to approximate Ξ, we start by considering only the states called recurrence classes
of the unperturbed process [16], shorten as recurrence classes (RC), that were used as the key
feature for the TEL and ODL proof of convergence. The system tends to spend naturally a
high amount of time in those states which thus play a major role in convergence metrics. The
reason comes from the combination of two properties. First, the network needs at least one
experimentation to leave an RC, which occurs with small probability . Secondly, by definition,
the network always naturally goes to an RC when no perturbation occurs. These states are
characterized by m = mC := (C,C, . . . , C), a = a¯, and u = u¯, i.e., all the players are in the
content mood and aligned (i.e. a = a¯, and u = u¯). We denote by R the set of these states. We
can also drop some notations, and we rewrite a state z = (mC , a, a¯,u, u¯) ∈ R as z = (a¯, u¯)
To reduce the number of RC, two invariances induced by the utility model are highlighted.
First of all, due to the binary utility values and the utility rules, interchanging actions between
players is equivalent to interchange the utility vector components accordingly, thus not modifying
the number of 0 and 1 in the utility vector. As such, we can deduce that it does not change the
“global” performance of the network. For instance, let consider a network with three players and
three resources z1 = ((r1, r2, r1), (0, 1, 0)) ∈ R. Players 1 and 3 have null utility because they
use the same resource. If we interchange the actions of player 1 and 2, z1 is transformed into
z2 = ((r2, r1, r1), (1, 0, 0)). There is always one player with utility 1 and two players with utility
0. Nothing has changed from a network perspective, thus, the algorithm performance remains
the same from these two states.
Secondly, notice also that interchanging the resource labels does not change at all the utility
vector (this is also true for geographical models when orthogonality between frequencies is
assumed). For instance, if we change the resource label 1 with label 3 and, label 2 with label
1, z1 becomes z3 = ((r3, r1, r3), (0, 1, 0)) which involves the same observations as the previous
modification.
These two invariances have led us to represent any RC with the ordered repartition of players
over resources. For any action vector a¯, we build the repartition vector of players over resources
d := (d1, d2, · · · , dN) where di =
∑K
k=1 1{ak=fi} is the number of players that use a resource
fi ∈ N . For instance, the repartition of player in z1 is d1 = (2, 1, 0) and the repartition vector
of z3 is d3 = (1, 0, 2). The ordered repartition vector is s = (s1, . . . , sN) where ∀i, j ∈ [1, N ],
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i < j, ∃i′, j′ ∈ [1, N ], si = di′ ≥ sj = dj′ . For instance, the ordered repartition vector of z1 is
s1 = (2, 1, 0) and, the ordered repartition of z3 is s3 = (2, 1, 0) which is equal to s1. Thus, it
follows that this representation makes no difference between RC that are invariant with respect to
the transformations mentioned. Hence, it is possible to reduce the number of RC in Ξ. Moreover,
the utility vector repartition is directly specified by the ordered repartition of players, then we
drop this notation and z = (a¯, u¯) becomes z = s.
In what follows, for ease of comprehension we slightly modify RC notations. For each z ∈ R
the number of resources employed is noted n =
∑N
`=1 1{s`>0}. In addition, for each n ∈ [1, N ]
there exists different possible ordered repartitions of players whose number is noted IN(n). It
is equal to the number of ways to partition integer N in n parts, i.e. IN(n) = Part(N, n) where
the recursive formula gives Part(N, n) = Part(N − 1, n − 1) + Part(N − n, n), and for any
integers x, y, Part(x, x) = 1, Part(x < y, y) = 0 and Part(x, 1) = 1 ([17] Chapter 2, Section
2.1, Theorem B). Thus, any z ∈ R can be noted Zn(i) where n is the number of resources used
and i ∈ [1, IN(n)] is the indices of the ordered repartition and, the associated ordered repartition
vector is Sn(i) = (Sin,1, S
i
n,2, . . . , S
i
n,N). For instance, in a network with N = K = 4, when
n = 2 there are two possible ordered repartition S2(1) = (3, 1, 0, 0) and S2(2) = (2, 2, 0, 0).
However, for n = 3 there is a unique repartition S3(1) = (2, 1, 1, 0). The mapping between
indices i and the ordered repartitions is arbitrary and has to be made by the experimenter. The
reduced states Zn(i) for all n ∈ [1, N ] and for all i ∈ [1, IN(n)] are called Reduced Recurrent
Classes (RRC).
Notice that the social welfare of RC represented by the same RRC are equal, but we can find
different RRC for which their elements have the same social welfare.
VI. APPROXIMATED MARKOV CHAIN
In this section, we build an approximation Ξ˜ of Ξ that is composed of the RRC and a subset of
intermediary states between RRC. More specifically, the construction of the intermediary states
considered in each approximations (TEL and ODL) is detailed. These constructions are driven
by, i) the willingness to conserve the ergodic property of Ξ in order to be able to approach its
convergence performance, ii) the need to construct a Markov chain with low dimension (i.e. with
the least number of states). A condition to make property i) realizable, consists in constructing
intermediary states around each RRC such that, all states of Ξ˜ (i.e. RRC and intermediary
states) are accessible from one another. We note ξn(i) the set that contains the RRC Zn(i)
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and some associated intermediary states that we define later. The simplest, thus verifying ii),
and necessary way to conserve the ergodicity property is to construct intermediary states such
that, if the transition between sets ξn(i)  ξn+1(j) exists then there also exists a transition
from sets ξn+1(j)  ξn(i) (the symbol  specifies that this transition can involve multiple
states in Ξ˜). This is the consequence of the fact that from every RRC Zn(i) where n < N ,
there are players interfered and, it is possible for one of them to find a free resource (e.g. an
interfered player experiments on a free resource). Repeating this process successively shows that,
all RRC can access ZN(1), which is the RRC without interference. Therefore, the condition, if
ξn(i) ξn+1(j) exists, then, so does ξn+1(j) ξn(i), implies that all sets communicate. Finally,
the previous condition becomes sufficient, if the sets are constructed such that all states in all
sets are accessible. In addition to these simplifications, we consider the following hypothesis to
build Ξ˜ completely.
Assumption 1: For each algorithm models, we assume at each iteration of the algorithm that
at most one content player can experiment, and such, solely when the system is in an all content
mood and aligned state, i.e. m = mC , u = u¯ and, a = a¯.
The reason to propose this assumption is summarized as follows. When all players are content,
the probability that one player experiments (i.e. 0 <   1) is larger than the probability that
two or more player experiment (i.e 0 < 2   1). Moreover, when the system is not aligned,
it goes in less than two steps and with an high probability (i.e. ≈ (1− )2) to a state in which
all players are content and aligned or, that contains a discontent player. Thus, most of the time,
the system is either in a) an all content and aligned state or, b) it contains at least one discontent
player. In case a), it is most probable that only one player experiments whereas, in case b), the
probability that a discontent player experiments is 1 which is much more important than the
probability for a content player to experiment ( 1).
Hypothesis 1: For TEL model, the probability that a discontent player accepts a new utility
u as a benchmark is 1 ≥ F (u) ≥  12K . We suppose that F (0) =  12K and that, F (1) = 0 = 1.
In other words, we suppose that the constants φ1 and φ2 from section II have been chosen such
that F (.) spans the whole available region.
In next two sections, we present the constructions of sets ξn(i) of each algorithm. We start the
reasoning by considering all sets ξn(i) = {Zn(i)}. Then we add successively intermediary states
in all sets to build the approximated Markov chain. When a state is added to ξn(i) it is also
added to any other set ξn′(i′) where i 6= i′ and n 6= n′. Figures 1a and 1b present, for ease of
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space and comprehension, a resulting partial view of Ξ˜’s intermediary models with two sets ξn(i)
and ξn+1(j) for TEL and ODL respectively. The lines define the oriented connections between
states. Plain lines correspond to direct transition inside the same set ξn(i) whereas dashed lines
correspond to direct transitions between different sets. The connexions are detailed in appendix
A and B for the TEL and ODL respectively. In these figures, without loss of generality, it is
supposed that, there exists j such that ξn(i) is connected to ξn+1(j). In such a case, we would
also like to have ξn+1(j) connected to ξn(i) for ergodicity. We also suppose that, all intermediary
states are present for simplicity of comprehension, whereas as explained in next two sections,
there exists some conditions in which they have to be deleted from their corresponding set to
keep Ξ˜ ergodic.
A. TEL model
This section presents the construction of the intermediary states in the approximated Markov
chain based on the TEL algorithm described in section II-A. Given any RRC Zn(i), a transition
where a player interfered finds a free resource, e.g. Zn(i) Zn+1(j), does not necessitate addi-
tional intermediary state unless one player is left alone on its resource after the experimentation.
In this situation, the left alone player sees its utility increases and becomes hopeful. Therefore,
we start by considering in ξn(i) the state ξn0 (i) in addition to Zn(i) where
• ξn0 (i) corresponds to a player alone in Zn(i) that is hopeful.
Thus, at this step, ∀n, i, ξn(i) = {Zn(i), ξn0 (i)}.
A transition in which the network uses one less frequency, e.g. ξn+1(j)  ξn(i), involves a
player that accepts a lower benchmark, which is only possible through a discontent mood. To
become discontent, a player passes through a watchful mood. This leads us to consider the two
intermediary states ξn1 (i) and ξ
n
2 (i) where
• ξn1 (i) is the state where a player alone in Zn(i) is watchful,
• ξn2 (i) is the state where a player alone in Zn(i) is discontent. It corresponds to the situation
where the watchful player in ξn1 (i) experiences one more iteration a decrease in utility.
Note that during the transition ξn1 (i) → ξn2 (i) (where → means that the transition is direct),
the system is not aligned whereas, a content player experiments. It is not in accordance with
hypothesis 1 but, this is the only time that the hypothesis 1 is overrided in order to keep the
chain ergodic. Finally, to avoid any absorbing state two more intermediary states ξn3 (i) and ξ
n
4 (i)
are considered where
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• ξn3 (i) is a state where two players that were alone in Zn(i) are using the same resource and
one of them is watchful. It corresponds to the case where the discontent player from ξn2 (i)
has updated its benchmark with the resource of a player that was not interfered in Zn(i).
• ξn4 (i) is a state where two players that were alone in Zn(i) are using the same resource and
one of them is discontent. It corresponds to the state that follows ξn3 (i) where the player
watchful becomes discontent.
The base to construct our model for TEL is established with ξn(i) = {Zn(i), ξn0 (i), ξn1 (i),
ξn2 (i), ξ
n
3 (i), ξ
n
4 (i)}. It is said in the introduction, that all intermediary states have to be accessible
but, in some cases they are not all present. For instance, when every player in Zn(i) is interfered,
no one can become discontent and states ξn1 (i), ξ
n
2 (i), ξ
n
3 (i) and ξ
n
4 (i) are not present. These
absences have to be taken into account, to compute the probabilities in appendix A, and during
simulations in order to build an ergodic chain (an isolated state in a matrix makes the chain not
ergodic). These cases are described as follows starting with any given ξn(i) = {Zn(i)}:
• If in Zn(i) all players are interfered, only the state Zn(i) is present
• If in Zn(i) one player is alone on its resource, this player can become discontent or hopeful,
however, it cannot make an other player discontent. Therefore, include states ξn0 (i), ξ
n
1 (i)
and ξn2 (i) in ξ
n(i). There is one exception, where the distribution Sn(i) is of the form
(2, . . . , 2, 1, 0, . . . , 0) and, the state ξn0 (i) is removed from ξ
n(i).
• If in Zn(i) at least two players are alone on their respective resource, include ξn3 (i) and
ξn4 (i) in ξ
n(i).
The transitions between states and the associated probabilities are detailed in appendix A.
B. ODL model
This section presents the construction of the intermediary states in the Markov chain approxi-
mation based on the ODL algorithm described in section II-B. First of all, the model that contains
only the ξn(i) = {Zn(i)} is sufficient to have an ergodic chain Ξ˜. The transition Zn(i)→ Zn(i)
occurs if nothing happens. The transition Zn(i) → Zn+1(j) represents an interfered player that
experiments and finds a free resource. The reversed transition Zn+1(i)→ Zn(j) occurs if one of
the not interfered player in Zn+1(j) goes back to the position of the experimenter from Zn(i).
The accuracy of the model can be increased by adding a few more states. The stability of ODL is
directly related to the number of discontent players. Such players experiment randomly, which
makes the number of possible transitions between states growing very fast with the number
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of discontent players. It prevents us from describing too many discontent players at the same
iteration. In this work, we manage to model the case where at most two players can be discontent
at the same time. Going beyond this would require for each additional discontent player a large
amount of extra transitions for a small accuracy gain. This model requires three more states
ξn1 (i), ξ
n
2 (i) and ξ
n
3 (i) to be added with each RRC Zn(i):
• ξn1 (i) corresponds to the case where a player alone in Zn(i) is discontent,
• ξn2 (i) corresponds to the case where two players alone in Zn(i) are discontent.
• ξn3 (i) is a state where one of two players that share the same resource in Zn(i) is discontent.
Like in previous section VI-A, there are some cases, depending on Zn(i), where ξn1 (i), ξ
n
2 (i)
and ξn3 (i) are not all present simultaneously in ξ
n(i). They have to be removed accordingly to
make the resulting Markov chain ergodic. These cases are described as follows starting with
ξn(i) = {Zn(i)}:
• If there exists a resource played by two players in Zn(i), include the state ξn3 (i) in the set
ξn(i).
• If at least one player in Zn(i) is alone on its resource, include the state ξn1 (i) in ξ
n(i).
• If at least two players in Zn(i) are alone on their respective resource, include ξn2 (i) in ξ
n(i).
The transitions between states and the associated probabilities are detailed in appendix B.
C. Complexity comparison
We compute the Markov chain complexities, to highlight the importance of the transformations
from Ξ to Ξ˜ made in this work. The simplifications and approximations are essential in order to
be able to predict the algorithm performance. The number of states in Ξ is given by the product
of component dimension of z = (m, a, a¯,u, u¯). The vector of player moods can have MK
values if the mood of each player can take M values. The vector of player actions and action
benchmarks a or a¯ can take NK values each one. The utility vector u is specified by the action
vector a and, the utility benchmark vector u¯ can take 2K values. Therefore, the complexity of Ξ
is (MN22)K . This is obviously intractable and, we have reduced the recurrence states R into Z
which has a cardinality |Z| = ∑Kn=1 Part(K,n). Afterwards, we have approximated Ξ by keeping
some intermediary states as detailed in previous section VI. Figure 2 presents the complexity of
Ξ and Ξ˜ for the TEL algorithm with respect to the number of players. The significant complexity
reduction allows us to predict performance numerically.
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Fig. 1. Partial view of Ξ˜ for both algorithms.
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Fig. 2. Complexity comparison between Ξ and Ξ˜.
VII. PROCEDURE TO COMPUTE THE TRANSITION MATRIX
Once the states of Ξ˜ are established, the next step consists in computing the transition
probabilities of matrix P. The procedure is described in algorithm 1 and summarized as follows.
The first step necessitates to generate all RRCs. For this purpose, a classical integer partitioning
algorithm is used to generate all ordered repartition vector Sn(i) [18]. The number of RRC using
n ∈ [1, . . . , N ] resources among N is given by IN(n) (see section V). In both algorithms, at each
RRC Zn(i) is associated an intermediary state model ξn(i), whose number of states depends
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on some exceptions specified in sections VI-A and VI-B for the TEL and ODL respectively.
One has to pay attention to these exceptions when it makes the one-to-one mapping function
between the states of Ξ˜ and the lines of P. Then, the algorithm 1 goes trough all Zn(i) and
looks for all j ∈ IN(n + 1) such that Zn+1(j) is accessible from Zn(i). When n < N , there
exists at least one such a j and, by construction the set ξn+1(j) is connected to the set ξn(i).
The transition probabilities are computed in the algorithm through three consecutive steps. These
steps and formulas are highlighted in the same order in appendices A and B for the TEL and
ODL respectively. On the first hand, the probabilities inside the set ξn(i) are computed. On the
second and third hand, for each j in IN(n + 1) such that ξn(i) is connected to ξn+1(j), the
algorithm computes, the probabilities from set ξn(i) to set ξn+1(j) and, the reverse probabilities
from set ξn+1(j) to set ξn(i).
The example provided in figure 3 with K = N = 5 highlights the links between the sets
ξn(i), identified by the vector Sn(i). For instance, the set in the top left corresponds to 5 players
interfering on the same resource.
Algorithm 1 Computing the matrix P - Part 1/2
Input: Z; ∀n ∈ [1, N ], IN(n); ∀n ∈ [1, N ], ∀i ∈ [1, IN(i)]
Output: P
1: Generate ∀n ∈ [1, N ] and ∀i ∈ [1, IN(n)], Zn(i) = (Sn(i)) with an integer partitioning
algorithm, and construct each set ξn(i) following rules in section VI
2: for n = 1 to N do
3: for i = 1 to IN(n) do
4: Select a distribution Sn(i) = [Sin,1, S
i
n,2, · · · , Sin,n, 0, 0, · · · , 0]
5: Compute the following probabilities using appendices A and B for TEL and ODL
respectively (check the existence of links using exceptions from sections VI-A and VI-B),
and fill the matrix P:
• (TEL) pZn(i)ξn1 (i), pZn(i)Zn(i), pξn1 (i)ξn2 (i), pξn1 (i)Zn(i), pξn2 (i)Zn(i), pξn2 (i)ξn3 (i), pξn2 (i)ξn2 (i),
pξn3 (i)ξn4 (i), pξn4 (i)ξn0 (i), pξn4 (i)ξn3 (i), pξn4 (i)ξn4 (i), pξn0 (i)Zn(i), pξn0 (i)Zn(i) using (4), (5), (7), (8),
(9), (10), (11), (13), (14), (15), (16), (18) respectively,
• (ODL) pZn(i)ξn1 (i), pZn(i)ξn2 (i), pZn(i)ξn3 (i), pZn(i)Zn(i), pξn1 (i)Zn(i), pξn1 (i)ξn2 (i), pξn1 (i)ξn1 (i),
pξn2 (i)Zn(i), pξn2 (i)ξn1 (i), pξn2 (i)ξn2 (i), pξn3 (i)Zn(i), pξn3 (i)ξn3 (i) using (24), (25), (26), (27), (33),
(34), (35), (38), (39), (40), (45), (46), respectively.
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5,0,0,0,0 4,1,0,0,0
3,2,0,0,0
3,1,1,0,0
2,2,1,0,0
2,1,1,1,0 1,1,1,1,1
Fig. 3. Example of transitions considered between RRC in our models for N = K = 5.
Algorithm 1 Computing the matrix P - Part 2/2
6: for k = 1 to n do
7: if Sin,k > 1 then
8: w ← (Sin,1, · · · , Sin,k − 1, · · · , Sin,n, 1, 0, · · · , 0)
9: w˜ ← w sorted in decreasing order
10: Find j ∈ IN(n+1) such that Sn+1(j) = w˜ which corresponds to state Zn+1(j)
11: Compute the following probabilities using appendices A and B for TEL and
ODL respectively (check the existence of links using exceptions from sections VI-A and
VI-B), and fill the matrix P:
• (TEL) pZn(i)Zn+1(j), pZn(i)ξn+10 , pξn+12 (j)Zn(i), pξn+14 (j)Zn(i), pξn+14 (j)ξn0 (i) using (19), (20),
(21), (22), (23) respectively,
• (ODL) pZn(i)Zn+1(j), pZn(i)ξn+11 (j), pZn(i)ξn+12 (j), pξn3 (i)Zn+1(j), pξn3 (i)ξn+11 (j), pξn3 (i)ξn+12 (j),
pZn+1(j)Zn(i), pZn+1(j)ξn3 (i), pξn+11 (j)Zn(i), pξn+11 (j)ξn3 (i), pξn+12 (j)Zn(i), pξn+12 (j)ξn1 (i), pξn+12 (j)ξn2 (i)
and pξn+12 (j)ξn3 (i) using (50), (51), (52),(47), (48), (49), (53), (55), (56), (57), (58), (59),
(60), (61) respectively.
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: end for
16: return P
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VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Accuracy of the proposed models
We assess the accuracy of our proposed models by comparing the values obtained for Ei [Tj]
using (2) and αj using (3) of Ξ˜, with Monte Carlo simulations. We consider three different
values for K = {3, 5, 7} in two cases N = K and, N = K + 2. In ODL, the constant c is equal
to K. Both algorithms are compared with respect to the same probability to experiment from a
content mood, i.e.  in TEL is equal to c in ODL. The EFHT τij is computed from, the state
i where all players are on the same resource (e.g. state with S1(1) = (5, 0, 0, 0, 0) in Figure 3),
to the state j where they are all on different resources (e.g. state with S5(1) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) in
Figure 3). The stability α is computed for the state j where all players use a different resource.
In Monte Carlo simulations with use 5000 trials to compute τij and 106 trials to compute α.
For TEL algorithm, Figures 4a and 4b present the EFHT and the fraction of time 1−α when
K = N respectively. The reason to display 1 − α instead of α is to discern the values close
to one at low . For both features, these results are accurate in comparison to Monte Carlo
simulations. The EFHT converges to the Monte Carlo results when  decreases. The little gap
observed at higher  is caused by an increasing probability to have more than one experiment at
a time. Thus, the probability for the system to not be aligned increases and, Assumption 1 is less
valid. The offset observed in Figure 4b is due to the fact that, we are able to represent accurately
at most one discontent player at each algorithm iteration. The stability is highly related to the
number of discontent players.
Figure 5a and 5b present the same results but with N = K + 2. The goal is to show the
coherence of our approximation. In that scenario, two resources have been added which results in
the decrease of the collision probability. Therefore, with respect to the first scenario, Assumption
1 is more accurate and, the probability of being discontent decreases. Consequently, the numerical
results of our approximation are closer to Monte Carlo simulations.
In addition, from figures 4 and 5, one can check the result from proposition 1, in which the
behaviour of EFHT is TEFHT = O( 1a2 ) where a2 > 0 and the behaviour of the stability is
1− α = O(a4) where a4 > 0.
For ODL algorithm, Figures 6a and 6b present when K = N the EFHT and the fraction of
time αj , respectively. For both features, these results are accurate in comparison to Monte Carlo
simulations. The gap observed at low  for stability metric is due to the number of discontent
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Fig. 4. EFHT comparisons between our approximated models and Monte Carlo simulations when N = K.
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Fig. 5. EFHT and stability comparisons between our approximated models and Monte Carlo simulations when N = K + 2.
players. We recall that the proposed approximation models accurately at most two discontent
players. When  decreases the number of discontent players increases (a player remains in D
with probability 1−  when u = 0) above two with an increasing probability and the model is
less accurate.
We present in Fig. 7a and 7b the same results but with N = K + 2. The accuracy of both
features studied is again assessed. The probability to have collisions decreases and so does the
probability to have an high number of discontent players. This leads to a better accuracy of the
proposed model.
Generally, one can notice how the stability decreases with the number of players and how the
convergence time increases. Furthermore, the convergence time decreases when the number of
resource increases. In addition, one can check the results from
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Fig. 6. EFHT and stability comparison between our approximated models and Monte Carlo simulations when N = K.
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Fig. 7. EFHT and stability comparison between our approximated models and Monte Carlo simulations when N = K + 2.
In addition, from figures 6 and 7, one can check the result from proposition 2, in which the
behaviour of EFHT is TEFHT = O( 1cb2 ) where b2 > 0 and the behaviour of the stability is
1− α = O(cb4) where b4 > 0.
B. Performance comparisons with approximation in the literature
In this section, we compare the results obtained in previous section with the approximation
given in paper [9], noted model 1 in this work. This last model figures of merit are computed
as follows. For the EFHT, the equation (33) in [9] is employed. For the stability, Theorem 5 in
[9] gives the stability αj but some corrections have been made. For instance, the term TCNE(k)
from [9] is replaced with equation (33)[9] whose sum is started in k instead of 0. The reason
for this change is that the variable TCNE(k) diverges when N = K and, it is an upper bound
of (33) [9].
21
10−3 10−2 10−1
101
102
103
104
105
ε
T E
FH
T
 
 
K=3 Rose
K=3 Ξ˜
K=5 Rose
K=5 Ξ˜
K=7 Rose
K=7 Ξ˜
(a) Convergence time
10−3 10−2 10−1
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
ε
1−
α
 
 
K=3 Rose
K=3 Ξ˜
K=5 Rose
K=5 Ξ˜
K=7 Rose
K=7 Ξ˜
(b) Fraction of time
Fig. 8. Performance comparison between our approximation and Rose approximation when N = K.
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Fig. 9. Performance comparison between our approximation and Rose approximation when N = K + 2.
Figures 8a and 9a present the EFHT of the models Ξ˜ and 1 when N = K and K + 2,
respectively. One can observe that both models are quite far from each other except for high .
Knowing that our model converges close to simulations, we immediately deduce the model 1
lack of accuracy.
On the other hand, Figures 8b and 9b present 1− αj when N = K and K + 2 respectively.
One can notice that, except for K = 3, the curves resulting from model 1 are above those of
model Ξ˜. As our model is a tight upper bound on Monte Carlo simulation (see figures 4b and
5b ), it again assesses the accuracy of our model.
For the stability metric, in the case N = 3 and K = N , the model 1 is as closed to Monte
Carlo simulations as our proposed approximation. However, contrary to model Ξ˜, the result for
N = K + 2 shows that model 1 gets away from the simulation contrary to our approximation
that gets closer. This proves the coherence of our model in comparison to model 1.
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C. Performance comparison between TEL and ODL
In previous sections, we have characterized the accuracy of TEL and ODL proposed models.
In this section, we take the advantage of the available approximations that have low complexity,
to compare both algorithms and, to analyse their performance in domains hardly reachable with
Monte Carlo simulations. Figures 10a and 10b present, for both algorithms, the EFHT (in log
scale) and the stability αj respectively. The number of resources used is N = K and N = K+5
and, the probability to experiment is fixed to  = ν = 10−3. The increase of N results for both
algorithms, first, in a better stability and, secondly, in a lower convergence time. This result
counteracts the argument that the convergence time increases with the alphabet size ([9] section
V. B.). The reason is that players find a free interference state faster and, the probability that
two players collide is less important when the set of free resources is bigger. There exists a
value of K such that the EFHT of both algorithms is the same. Below this value ODL is more
efficient than TEL with respect to the convergence time and beyond this value the behavior is
inverted. More generally, the fact that in some cases TEL converges faster than ODL contradicts
the idea that, the bigger is the algorithm controller (4 moods for TEL and 2 moods for ODL),
the slower its convergence is, as it is said in [10] (section IV-B). In addition, Figure 10b shows
that TEL is much more stable than ODL even when N is increased and such, at any K. Figure
11 presents the same results as in Figure 10 but with  = ν = 10−4. The convergence time
of both algorithms are increased. This is not a surprise as we deduce from proposition 1 that
TEFHT = O
(
1
a1
)
. The decrease of  increases the stability of both algorithms. As  decreases, so
does the number of experiments from players in state C. Thus, the probability that two players
or more collide also decreases with  which results in an higher stability of the state. More
generally, the convergence and stability tendency remain the same in comparison to Figure 10.
From figures 10a and 11a one can assess what results from observations 1 and 2. The EFHT
of ODL and TEL respectively follow an exponential and a polynomial behaviour with respect
to K (the y-axis is in log scale). From figures 10b and 11b one can guess the exponential and
polynomial decreasing of the ODL and TEL stability respectively. Figure 12 presents the stability
1 − α and α with respect to K for the TEL and ODL respectively. These two figures confirm
the previous guess and assess the convergence results of observations 1 and 2.
To conclude, in our system model, ODL is less stable than TEL. There exists some region of
K for which ODL converges faster. However, the gain in speed convergence is not considerable
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Fig. 10. Performance comparison between TEL and ODL when  = 10−3 with respect to K.
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Fig. 11. Performance comparison between TEL and ODL when  = 10−4 with respect to K.
and, the exponential behavior of ODL with respect to K makes the convergence of this algorithm
possibly very long in large systems. This small advantage in convergence speed is compromised
by less stability. In view of the results, I would recommend that, the use of ODL algorithm in
an environment with important utility variation is preferable when the need in stability is not
important and the amount of players is limited.
IX. CONCLUSION
This work provides a detailed performance analysis of well known model-free learning strate-
gies, TEL and ODL, that converge in a broad class of games. To overcome the huge dimension
of the inherent Markov Chains of the game, we provide an approximation of these chains. This
allows computing a close approximation of the average time the system stays in a desired state
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Fig. 12. Stability performance of TEL and ODL with respect to K.
as well as the average time required to achieved that state for the first time. Thanks to the above
approximations, a comparison between the performance of TEL and ODL is provided.
APPENDIX A
PROBABILITIES INVOLVED IN TEL APPROXIMATION
This appendix describes all the possible transitions and probabilities of TEL algorithm model
presented in Figures 1a.
Remind with hypothesis 1 that, a discontent player accepts a free resource with probability
0 = 1 and, it accepts a resource already interfered with probability F (0) = 
1
2K . In addition, with
assumption 1, we approximate the probability that there is one experimentation among K content
players by the probability that at least one experimentation happens P(K) = 1− (1− )K .
A. Notations and preliminaries
Like in Figure 1a, we consider two sets ξn(i) and ξn+1(j). We assume the presence of all
the intermediary states in order to derive the most general transition probabilities. In practice,
using section VI-A, the reader must check the existence of the intermediary states involved in
sets before computing the probabilities.
The probability computation require the knowledge of the players repartition over resources.
For each set ξn(i), the number of resources having p players in Zn(i) is noted M in(p) =∑
k 1{Sin,k=p} and the number of players that share a resource with p − 1 other players in
Zn(i) is noted min(p) = pM
i
n(p).
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During a transition from ξn(i) to ξn+1(j), a resource is decremented by one player and a free
resource is incremented. We note k(i, j) the resource decremented such that the term Sin,k(i,j)
of Sn(i) is decremented by one. Meanwhile, the term Sin,n+1 is incremented by one. During the
reverse transition from ξn+1(j) to ξn(i), the most left column of Sn+1(j) that has Sin,k(i,j) − 1
players is incremented by one and, Sjn+1,n+1 is decremented by one.
B. Transitions inside each ξn(i)
We start by describing the transitions inside ξn(i) that is to say between the states Zn(i),
ξn0 (i), ξ
n
1 (i), ξ
n
2 (i), ξ
n
3 (i) and ξ
n
4 (i). State Zn(i) is connected to ξ
n
1 (i) and itself. The transition
Zn(i) → ξn1 (i) happens when a player that is not interfered becomes watchful. It is given by
probability
pZn(i)ξn1 (i) =
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(K)
K − 1
K
(b)︷ ︸︸ ︷
M in(1)
N − 1 . (4)
where (a) is the probability that there is an experimentation from any player except the one
that is going to be interfered and, (b) is the probability to select the frequency of a player
not interfered. The probability of transition Zn(i) → Zn(i) is computed using the conservation
probability property
pZn(i)Zn(i) = 1− pZn(i)ξn1 (i) − pZn(i)Zn+1 , (5)
where pZn(i)Zn+1 is the probability for the network to find a new resource. It is given by
pZn(i)Zn+1 =
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(K)
(K −min(1))
K
(b)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Mni (0)
N − 1 , (6)
where (a) is the probability that an interfered player experiments and, (b) is the probability that
it finds a free resource.
From the state ξn1 (i), the network can directly go in Zn(i) or ξ
n
2 (i). With assumption 1, we
do not consider any experimentation in ξn1 (i) except the one needed to make the Markov chain
ergodic in transition ξn1 (i) → ξn2 (i). This later happens if the watchful player (which cannot
experiment) is subjected to a second experiment on its resource by an other player. This is given
by the following probability
pξn1 (i)ξn2 (i) = P(K − 1)
1
N − 1 . (7)
26
Otherwise, we do not consider any other case from ξn1 (i) and, the system goes naturally from
ξn1 (i) to Zn(i) with probability
pξn1 (i)Zn(i) = 1− pξn1 (i)ξn2 (i). (8)
State ξn2 (i) is connected to Zn(i) and ξ
n
3 (i). During transition ξ
n
2 (i)→ Zn(i), on the first hand,
the discontent player selects a free resource. There are Mni (0) free resources in addition to the
discontent player resource. Secondly, it accepts it as a new benchmark with probability F (1) = 1
(hypothesis 2). The probability of this transition is thus given by
pξn2 (i)Zn(i) =
Mni (0) + 1
N
, (9)
The transition ξn2 (i)→ ξn3 (i) happens if the discontent player selects a resource already occupied
by only one player and, it updates its benchmark with probability F (0) = 
1
2K (hypothesis 1).
The new player interfered becomes watchful in next iteration. From the discontent player point
of view, there are Mni (1) − 1 players alone on their resource. The transition happens with the
following probability
pξn2 (i)ξn3 (i) =
Mni (1)− 1
N

1
2K . (10)
The probability of transition ξn2 (i) → ξn2 (i) is computed using the conservation probability
property
pξn2 (i)ξn2 (i) = 1− pξn2 (i)Zn(i) − pξn2 (i)ξn3 (i) − pξn2 (i)Zn−1 , (11)
where pξn2 (i)Zn−1 is the probability that the discontent player selects and accepts a resource already
occupied by two players or more, which has probability
pξn2 (i)Zn−1 =
N −M in(1)−M in(0)
N

1
2K (12)
In state ξn3 (i), the system is not aligned and there is no discontent player. Thus, with assump-
tion 1, no experiment is proceeded and, the system moves directly to state ξn4 (i) with probability
pξn3 (i)ξn4 (i) = 1. (13)
The state ξn4 (i) is connected to ξ
n
0 (i) and ξ
n
3 (i). For the following transitions, it useful to note
that in ξn4 (i), the number of resources with players that do not interfere is M
n
i (1)− 2 and, the
number of free resources is Mni (0)+1. The transition ξ
n
4 (i)→ ξn0 (i) corresponds to the situation
where the discontent player chooses a free resource, that it accepts with probability F (1) = 1
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(hypothesis 1). The player left alone sees its utility increases and becomes hopeful. This happens
with probability
pξn4 (i)ξn0 (i) =
Mni (0) + 1
N
. (14)
Transition ξn4 (i) → ξn3 (i) occurs when the discontent player selects an occupied resource with
one player (there are Mni (1) − 2 of them from ξn4 (i)) and, it accepts this resource as a new
benchmark with probability 
1
2K according to hypothesis 1. Thus, the new player interfered
becomes watchful with probability
pξn4 (i)ξn3 (i) =
Mni (1)− 2
N

1
2K . (15)
The probability to remain in ξn4 (i) is
pξn4 (i)ξn4 (i) = 1− pξn4 (i)ξn0 (i) − pξn4 (i)ξn3 (i) − pξn4 (i)Zn−1 , (16)
where pξn4 (i)Zn−1 is the probability that, the network use one less frequency with all players
content and aligned. This happens if the discontent player selects and accepts one of the N −
M in(1)−M in(0) resources already occupied by two players or more or, if it selects and accepts its
current resource where the content player interfered is aligned (i.e. it is going to accept the choice
of the discontent player). Consequently, the system uses one less frequency with probability
pξn4 (i)Zn−1 =
N −M in(1)−M in(0) + 1
N

1
2K , (17)
and the probability that it remains one more step in ξn4 (i) is pξn4 (i)ξn4 (i) = 0. Once the network is
in ξn0 (i), one player is hopeful and with assumption 1, no player can experiment. Thus, in next
step this player becomes content with a benchmark update and the network goes to Zn(i) with
the following probability
pξn0 (i)Zn(i) = 1. (18)
C. Transitions from ξn(i) to ξn+1(j)
The only way for the network to find a new resource is to go through a RC Zn(i). If the
network is not in Zn(i) either one player is discontent or the network is not aligned. In the later,
assumption 1 tells us that no player experiments, whereas in the former, the discontent player
cannot discover a free resource because it is not interfered in Zn(i).
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During transition Zn(i)→ Zn+1(j), a player experiments on a free resource with probability
pZn(i)Zn+1(j) =

(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(K)
min(S
i
n,k(i,j))
K
(b)︷ ︸︸ ︷
Mni (0)
N − 1 , if S
i
n,k(i,j) > 2,
0, if Sin,k(i,j) = 2,
(19)
where (a) is the probability to have an experimentation from any player interfered on resources
with Sin,k(i,j) > 2 players and, (b) is the probability to select a free resource. The second
line corresponds to an other transition Zn(i) → ξn+10 (j), in which the player left alone after
the experimentation sees its utility increase and becomes hopeful. The probability of transition
Zn(i)→ ξn+10 (j) is thus complementary to the previous one and, it is given by
pZn(i)ξn+10 (j) =
 0, if S
i
n,k(i,j) > 2,
P(K)
min(S
i
n,k(i,j)
)
K
Mni (0)
N−1 , if S
i
n,k(i,j) = 2.
(20)
D. Transitions from ξn+1(j) to ξn(i)
The approximation is constructed such that if it is possible to go from ξn(i) to ξn+1(j), it is
also possible to go from ξn+1(j) to ξn(i) (see section VI-A). The way for the system to go in
a set where one less resource is employed only happens in states with a discontent player, i.e.
ξn+12 (j) and ξ
n+1
4 (j) for transition ξ
n+1(j) to ξn(i). In practice, to compute the transitions inside
ξn+1(j), we use the formulas in appendix A-B by replacing the indices appropriately. In this
section, the starting state is in ξn+1(j). Therefore, we use the functions mjn+1(.) and M
j
n+1(.)
instead of min(.) and M
i
n(.). Moreover, during a transition from ξ
n(i) to ξn+1(j), the resource
that contained Sin,k(i,j) in Sn(i) has been decremented by one. Thus, the transition from ξ
n+1(j)
to ξn(i) occurs if any resource that contains Sin,k(i,j) − 1 players is incremented by one.
The transition ξn+12 (j) → Zn(i) happens if the discontent player selects a frequency with
Sin,k(i,j) − 1 players and accept the new benchmark. The probability of ξn+12 (j)→ Zn(i) is thus
given by
pξn+12 (j)Zn(i) =

Mn+1j (S
i
n,k(i,j)
−1)
N

1
2K , if Sin,k(i,j) − 1 ≥ 2,
0, if Sin,k(i,j) − 1 = 1,
(21)
where, the second line is null because it is represented by transition ξn+12 (j) → ξn+13 (j) (see
(10) with appropriate indices changes).
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The transition ξn+14 (j) → Zn(i) happens when the discontent player selects an occupied
resource and all players are content and aligned in the end. This is given by probability
pξn+14 (j)Zn(i) =
 0, if S
i
n,k(i,j) − 1 ≥ 2,
1
N

1
2K , if Sin,k(i,j) − 1 = 1,
(22)
where, the first line is null because this corresponds to the transition ξn+14 (j)→ ξn0 (i) described
afterwards. The second line is the probability for the discontent player to select and to accept the
current resource. The transition ξn+14 (j) → ξn0 (i) corresponds to the case where the discontent
player selects and accepts a resource with Sin,k(i,j)−1 ≥ 2 players. Consequently, the player that
is left alone becomes hopeful with probability
pξn+14 (j)ξn0 (i) =

Mn+1j (S
i
n,k(i,j)
−1)
N

1
2K , if Sin,k(i,j) − 1 ≥ 2,
0, if Sin,k(i,j) − 1 = 1,
(23)
where, the second line corresponds to previous transition ξn+14 (j)→ Zn(i).
APPENDIX B
PROBABILITIES INVOLVED IN ODL APPROXIMATION
This appendix describes all the possible transitions and probabilities of ODL algorithm model
presented in Figure 1b. We also use the same notations and preliminaries specified in appendix
A-A.
In ODL, a player which perceives a utility or an action change accepts the new benchmark
with probability 1−u or, it refuses it and becomes discontent with probability 1− 1−u.
A. Transitions inside ξn(i)
We start by describing the transitions between the states Zn(i), ξn1 (i), ξ
n
2 (i) and ξ
n
3 (i). The
state Zn(i) is connected to ξn1 (i), ξ
n
2 (i), ξ
n
3 (i). Transition Zn(i) → ξn1 (i) happens if an alone
player becomes discontent after perceiving a utility change that it does not accept. This situation
arises with probability
pZn(i)ξn1 (i) =
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(K)(K −m
i
n(1)−min(2))
K
M in(1)
N − 1
(b)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− ) . (24)
where (a) is the probability that any player interfered by two players or more experiments on a
resource with solely one player, (b) is the probability that this alone player becomes discontent.
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The transition Zn(i)→ ξn2 (i) represents the situation where two players alone in Zn(i) become
discontent in one step, whose probability is
pZn(i)ξn2 (i) =
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(K)m
i
n(1)
K
M in(1)− 1
N − 1
(b)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− )2, (25)
where, (a) is the probability that an alone player experiments on a resource with an other
alone player and, (b) is the probability that both players become discontent.
The transition Zn(i)→ ξn3 (i) represents the situation where, from a resource with two players,
one of them experiments on an other resource with one player and, one of them ends in discontent
mood. This happens with probability
pZn(i)ξn3 (i) =
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(K)m
i
n(2)
K
(b)︷ ︸︸ ︷
M in(1)
N − 12(1− ), (26)
where (a) is the probability that a player experiments from a resource with two of them, (b)
is the probability to interfere with one player and, one of the two players involved becomes
discontent. The presence of multiplier 2 in term (b) means that, inverting player’s label is a
different event that results in the same state ξn3 (i) and with the same probability.
The transition Zn(i)→ Zn(i) is computed using probability conservation as follows,
pZn(i)Zn(i) = 1− pZn(i)ξn1 (i) − pZn(i)ξn2 (i) − pZn(i)ξn3 (i) − pZn(i)Zn+1 − pZn(i)Zn−1
− pZn(i)ξn+11 − pZn(i)ξn+12 − pZn(i)ξn−13 ,
(27)
where pZn(i)Zn+1 is the probability for any interfered player to select a free resource, pZn(i)Zn−1
is the probability for any not interfered player to become interfered, pZn(i)ξn+11 and pZn(i)ξn+12
are similar to pZn(i)Zn+1 with one and two players ending in discontent mood respectively and,
pZn(i)ξn−13 is the probability that two players alone in Zn(i) finish on the same resource with one
of them discontent. The first probability is given by
pZn(i)Zn+1 = P(K)
(K −min(1))
K
Mni (0)
N − 1 , (28)
which is the same as equation (6) in the TEL model. The second probability is given by
pZn(i)Zn−1 =
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(K)m
i
n(1)
K
( (b)︷ ︸︸ ︷
N −M in(1)−M in(0)
N − 1 +
(c)︷ ︸︸ ︷
M in(1)− 1
N − 1 
2
)
, (29)
where, (a) is the probability for a player that is not interfered to experiment, (b) is the probability
that it experiments on resource with two players or more and that it updates its benchmark, (c)
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is the probability to select the resource of a player not interfered and that both accept this new
benchmark. Probability pZn(i)ξn+11 is given by
pZn(i)ξn+11 = P(K)
K −min(1)
K
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
N −M in(1)−M in(0)− 1
N − 1 (1− ), (30)
where (a) is the probability that the player interfered selects a frequency with two players or
more, except its own resource, and, that it ends in discontent mood.
The probability to end in ξn+12 is
pZn(i)ξn+12 = P(K)
K −min(1)
K
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
M in(1)
N − 1 (1− )
2, (31)
where (a) is the probability that the experimenter selects the resource of player not interfered
and that both end up in discontent mood.
Finally, the probability to go from Zn(i) to ξn−13 is given by
pZn(i)ξn−13 = P(K)
min(1)
K
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
M in(1)− 1
N − 1 2(1− ), (32)
where (a) is the probability that the experimenter selects a resource with a player not interfered
and, one of them ends in discontent mood. The multiplier 2 has a similar role than in (26).
The state ξn1 (i) is connected to Zn(i) and ξ
n
2 (i) inside the set ξ
n(i). During transition ξn1 (i)→
Zn(i) the discontent player either chooses a free resource or its current benchmark with proba-
bility
pξn1 (i)Zn(i) =
M in(0) + 1
N
. (33)
During transition ξn1 (i) → ξn2 (i), the discontent player makes an other player discontent in
addition to itself. This is given by probability
pξn1 (i)ξn2 (i) =
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
M in(1)− 1
N
(1− )2, (34)
where (a) is the probability that the discontent player selects a resource that contains a player
alone, except its own resource.
The probability pξn1 (i)ξn1 (i) is obtained using the conservation property:
pξn1 (i)ξn1 (i) = 1− pξn1 (i)Zn(i) − pξn1 (i)ξn2 (i) − pξn1 (i)Zn−1 − pξn1 (i)ξn−13 , (35)
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where pξn1 (i)Zn−1 and pξn1 (i)ξn−13 are the probability for the system starting in ξ
n
1 (i) to end for all
j ∈ IN(n− 1) in states Zn−1(j) and ξn−13 (j) respectively. The first probability is given by
pξn1 (i)Zn−1 =
N −M in(0)−M in(1)
N
+
M in(1)− 1
N
2, (36)
which are similar to terms (b)+(c) in (29) except the choice is made over all resources as the
player is in state D.
The second probability is given by
pξn1 (i)ξ
n−1
3
=
M in(1)− 1
N
2(1− ), (37)
which is similar to (a) in (32) except that the choice is made among N resources.
The state ξn2 (i) is connected to ξ
n
1 (i) and Zn(i). The probability of transition ξ
n
2 (i) → Zn(i)
is given by
pξn2 (i)Zn(i) =
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
M in(0) + 2
N
(b)︷ ︸︸ ︷
M in(0) + 1
N
, (38)
where (a) is the probability that the first discontent player selects a free resource. The number
of free resource is M in(0) in addition to the 2 resources left by the discontent players. Term
(b) is the probability that the other discontent player selects a free resource given that, the first
discontent player has already selected a free resource.
The probability of a transition ξn2 (i)→ ξn1 (i) is given by
pξn2 (i)ξn1 (i) = 2
M in(0) + 2
N
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
N −M in(1)−M in(0)
N
(1− ), (39)
where (a) is similar to the term (a) in (30) except there is one more resource available.
The probability to remain in ξn2 (i) is given by probability conservation
pξn2 (i)ξn2 (i) = 1− pξn2 (i)Zn(i) − pξn2 (i)ξn1 (i) − pξn2 (i)Zn−1 − pξn2 (i)ξn−11 − pξn2 (i)ξn−12 − pξn2 (i)ξn−13 , (40)
where pξn2 (i)Zn−1 , pξn2 (i)ξn−11 and pξn2 (i)ξn−12 represent the probability that the system uses one less
resource and, that, respectively, all player are content and aligned, one player ends discontent and
two players end discontent. The probability pξn2 (i)ξn−13 corresponds to the event where two players
not interfered end on the same resource with one of them discontent. A transition ξn2 (i)→ Zn−1
happens if one of the two discontent players selects a resource already occupied and the system
ends in an all content and aligned state. The probability of the first events is given by
pξn2 (i)Zn−1 =
M in(0) + 2
N
M in(1)− 1
N
2 + 2
M in(0) + 2
N
N −M in(1)−M in(0)
N
, (41)
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The transition ξn2 (i) → ξn−11 happens if one of the two discontent players selects a resource
already occupied and the system ends with one player discontent. The probability of all these
possible events is given by
pξn2 (i)ξ
n−1
1
= 2
N −M in(1)−M in(0)
N

N −M in(1)−M in(0)
N
(1− )
+ 2
M in(1)− 2
N
2
N −M in(1)−M in(0) + 1
N
(1− ),
(42)
where the first terms in the sum deals with the cases in which one of the two discontent players
accepts a resource with two players or more and, the second term concerns the case in which
one of the two players selects a resource with one player solely.
The probability of transition from ξn2 (i) to ξ
n−1
2 is the probability that one player updates
its benchmark with a resource already occupied and that, the systems ends with two discontent
players. It is given by
pξn2 (i)ξ
n−1
2
= 2
N −M in(1)−M in(0)
N

M in(1)− 2
N
(1−)2 +M
i
n(1)− 2
N
2
M in(1)− 3
N
(1−)2, (43)
where the first term deals with the case in which, one of the discontent players updates its
benchmark with a resource that contains two players or more and, the second term concerns the
scenario where both discontent players select a resource with one player. More specifically, in
the second term, once the first discontent player has selected a resource with one player and,
both have accepted the new benchmark, there is now one less resource with one player, i.e.
M in(1)− 3.
The transition ξn2 (i) to ξ
n−1
3 happens if one of the discontent players finds a free resource
and, the other selects the resource of a player not interfered. In this last situation one of the two
players interfered becomes discontent. This is given by the following probability
pξn2 (i)ξ
n−1
3
=
M in(0) + 2
N
M in(1)− 1
N
2(1− ), (44)
The state ξn3 (i) is linked to Zn(i) and itself in the set ξn(i). During transition ξ
n
3 (i)→ Zn(i)
the system comes back to the all content and aligned state with probability
pξn3 (i)Zn(i) =
(a)︷︸︸︷

N
+
(b)︷ ︸︸ ︷
M in(1)
N
2, (45)
where (a) is the probability that the discontent player tries the current resource and that it updates
its benchmark. Note that, the player interfered is already aligned from ξn3 (i). Term (b) is the
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probability that the discontent player tries an other resource with one player and both accept the
new benchmark.
The probability to remain in ξn3 (i) is given by
pξn3 (i)ξn3 (i) = 1− pξn3 (i)Zn(i) − pξn3 (i)Zn+1 − pξn3 (i)ξn+11 − pξn3 (i)ξn+12 , (46)
where pξn3 (i)Zn+1 , pξn3 (i)ξn+11 and pξn3 (i)ξn+12 are the probabilities for the system to use one more
frequency from ξn3 (i) and, respectively, the system ends with all players content, one player
discontent and two players discontent. Note that, these transitions lead to one unique state j in
IN(n+ 1), Zn+1(j), ξn+11 (j) and ξ
n+1
2 (j). The transition ξ
n
3 (i)→ Zn+1(j) occurs if the system
ends in an all content mood and aligned with one more frequency used after the experimentation.
It happens if the discontent player chooses a free resource with probability
pξn3 (i)Zn+1(j) =

M in(0)
N
, if Sn,k(i,j) = 2,
0, otherwise.
(47)
The term pξn3 (i)Zn+1 is the sum over all possible j of pξn3 (i)Zn+1(j). Consequently, pξn3 (i)Zn+1 =
M in(0)
N
.
The transition ξn3 (i)→ ξn+11 (j) occurs if the discontent cluster remains discontent. It happens
with probability
pξn3 (i)ξ
n+1
1 (j)
=

N−M in(1)−M in(0)−1
N
(1− ), if Sn,k(i,j) = 2,
0, otherwise.
(48)
where the first line is the probability that the discontent player experiments on a resource, with
two players or more, except the current one and, that it remains discontent. After this event, the
player left alone by the discontent player is no more interfered and accepts the new benchmark
with probability 1. The total probability to go in ξn+11 is pξn3 (i)ξn+11 =
N−M in(1)−M in(0)−1
N
(1− ).
The event that leads to transition ξn3 (i)→ ξn+12 (j) is realized if the discontent player experi-
ments on an other resource with a cluster not interfered and both end in discontent. This happens
with probability
pξn3 (i)ξ
n+1
2 (j)
=

M in(1)
N
(1− )2, if Sn,k(i,j) = 2,
0, otherwise.
(49)
Using the same reasoning, pξn3 (i)ξn+12 =
M in(1)
N
(1− )2.
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B. Transition from ξn(i) to ξn+1(j)
The only states in ξn(i) from which the system can use one more frequency are Zn(i) and
ξn3 (i). In other states, the discontent players are alone on their resource, which mean that they
cannot discover a new one.
The transitions ξn3 (i)→ Zn+1(j), ξn3 (i)→ ξn+11 (j) and ξn3 (i)→ ξn+12 (j) have been described
in equations (47), (48) and (49).
The transition Zn(i) → Zn+1(j) happens if a player on a resource with Sin,k(i,j) experiments
on a free resource. It is given by probability
pZn(i)Zn+1(j) = P(K)
min(S
i
n,k(i,j))
K
Mni (0)
N − 1 , (50)
which is term j of the sum that gives the total probability pZn(i)Zn+1 (28). The term K −min(1)
in (28) is decomposed as follows
∑
jm
i
n(S
i
n,k(i,j)) = K −min(1).
The transition from Zn(i) → ξn+11 (j) corresponds to the term j of the sum that gives
probability Zn(i)→ ξn+11 in (30). Using the same procedure
pZn(i)ξn+11 (j) = P(K)
min(S
i
n,k(i,j))
K
N −M in(1)−M in(0)− 1
N − 1 (1− ), (51)
Again with the same decomposition, probability of transition Zn(i)→ ξn+12 (j) is obtained using
(31) as follows
pZn(i)ξn+12 (j) = P(K)
min(S
i
n,k(i,j))
K
M in(1)
N − 1 (1− )
2, (52)
C. Transitions from ξn+1(j) to ξn(i)
The system can employ one less resource when an alone player selects a resource already
occupied as a new benchmark. These transitions are possible from states Zn+1(j), ξn+11 (j) and
ξn+12 (j). In practice, probability transitions inside ξ
n+1(j), are computed from formulas in section
B-A by replacing the indices appropriately. For example, in this section, the starting state is
in ξn+1(j). Therefore, we use the functions mjn+1(.) and M
j
n+1(.) instead of m
i
n(.) and M
i
n(.).
Moreover, during a transition from ξn(i) to ξn+1(j), the resource that has Sin,k(i,j) is decremented
by one. Thus, from ξn+1(j), any resource that contains Sin,k(i,j) − 1 players can be incremented
by one to make the transition to ξn(i) occurs.
The transition Zn+1(j)→ Zn(i) happens with probability
pZn+1(j)Zn(i) =
 P(K)
mjn+1(1)
K
Mjn+1(S
i
n,k(i,j)
−1)
N−1 , S
i
n,k(i,j) − 1 > 1
P(K)m
j
n+1(1)
K
Mjn+1(1)−1
N−1 
2, Sin,k(i,j) − 1 = 1.
(53)
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The first line corresponds to the probability that an alone player experiments on a resource with
Sin,k(i,j) − 1 > 1 players, and that it accepts the decrease in utility. The second line corresponds
to the probability that an alone player experiments on a resource with Sin,k(i,j) − 1 = 1 player,
and that both accept the decrease in utility. From the experimenter point of view, there are
M jn+1(1)− 1 resources with one player.
Note that pZn+1(j)Zn(i) is the term i of the sum that gives pZn+1(j)Zn =
∑
i pZn+1(j)Zn(i) in
(29). Therefore, the first and second line of (53) are, with respect to the right indices changes,
the term i of the sum that gives the first term and the second term of (29) respectively. These
similarities are used in what follows.
The transition probabilities pZn+1(j)ξn3 (i), pξn+11 (j)Zn(i), pξn+11 (j)ξn3 (i), pξn+12 (j)ξn1 (i), pξn+12 (j)ξn2 (i) and
pξn+12 (j)ξn3 (i) correspond to the term i of the sum that gives pZn+1(j)ξn3 pZn+1(j)Zn , pξn+11 (j)Zn ,
pξn+11 (j)ξn3 , pξn+12 (j)ξn1 and pξn+12 (j)ξn3 respectively. After changing the indices n+1 into n, n into n−1
and j into i, one can realize that these probabilities have already been computed. They correspond
to pZn(i)ξn−13 , pZn(i)Zn−1 , pξn1 (i)Zn , pξn1 (i)ξn−13 , pξn2 (i)ξn−11 and pξn2 (i)ξn−13 from (32), (36), (37),(41),
(42) and (44) respectively. Thus, to obtain pZn+1(j)ξn3 (i), pξn+11 (j)Zn(i), pξn+11 (j)ξn3 (i), pξn+12 (j)ξn1 (i),
pξn+12 (j)ξn2 (i) and pξn+12 (j)ξn3 (i), we use previous probabilities by changing the indices appropriately
and then, the i th term of the sum that results in N −M jn+1(0)−M jn+1(1) is selected. This term
corresponds to M jn+1(S
i
n,k(i,j) − 1) as∑
i,Si
n,k(i,j)
−1>1
M jn+1(S
i
n,k(i,j) − 1) = N −M jn+1(0)−M jn+1(1). (54)
With these modifications and, using (32), the transition Zn+1(j)→ ξn3 (i) has a probability
pZn+1(j)ξn3 (i) =
 0, S
i
n,k(i,j) − 1 > 1
P(K)
mjn+1(1)
K
Mjn+1(1)−1
N−1 2(1− ), Sin,k(i,j) − 1 = 1.
(55)
From state ξn+11 (j) it is possible to go to Zn(i) and ξ
n
3 (i). During transition ξ
n+1
1 (j)→ Zn(i)
the discontent player chooses a frequency that contains Sin,k(i,j)− 1 players. It happens with the
following probabilities
pξn+11 (j)Zn(i) =

Mjn+1(S
i
n,k(i,j)
−1)
N
, Sin,k(i,j) − 1 > 1
Mjn+1(1)−1
N
2, Sin,k(i,j) − 1 = 1.
(56)
The first line is similar to the term i of the sum that results in the first term of (36). The second
line corresponds to the second term of (36).
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With the same reasoning, using (37), ξn+11 (j)→ ξn3 (i) happens with probability
pξn+11 (j)ξn3 (i) =
 0, S
i
n,k(i,j) − 1 > 1
Mjn+1(1)−1
N
2(1− ), Sin,k(i,j) − 1 = 1.
(57)
The state ξn+12 (j) is connected to Zn(i), ξ
n
1 (i), ξ
n
2 (i) and ξ
n
2 (i). The probability of transition
ξn+12 (j)→ Zn(i) is obtained using (41) as follows
pξn+12 (j)Zn(i) =
 2
Mjn+1(0)+2
N
Mjn+1(S
i
n,k(i,j)
−1)
N
, if Cin,k(i,j) − 1 > 1,
Mjn+1(0)+2
N
Mjn+1(1)−1
N
2, if Sin,k(i,j) − 1 = 1.
(58)
The first line is similar to the term i of the sum that results in the second term of (41). The
second line is similar to the first term of (41).
The probability of transition ξn+12 (j)→ ξn1 (i), noted pξn+12 (j)ξn1 (i), is given by 2
Mjn+1(S
i
n,k(i,j)
−1)
N

N−Mjn+1(1)−Mjn+1(0)
N
(1− ), Sin,k(i,j) − 1 > 1,
2
Mjn+1(1)−2
N
2
N−Mjn+1(1)+1−Mjn+1(0)
N
(1− ), Sin,k(i,j) − 1 = 1.
(59)
which is obtained from equation (42).
The probability of transition ξn+12 (j)→ ξn2 (i) is given by
pξn+12 (j)ξn2 (i) =
 2
Mjn+1(S
i
n,k(i,`)
−1)
N

Mjn+1(1)−2
N
(1− )2, if Sin,k(i,j) − 1 ≥ 2,
Mjn+1(1)−2
N
2
Mjn+1(1)−3
N
(1− )2, if Sin,k(i,j) − 1 = 1.
(60)
which is obtained from equation (43).
Finally, the probability of transition ξn+12 (j)→ ξn3 (i) is obtained using equation (44) as follows
pξn+12 (j)ξn3 (i) =
 0, if S
i
n,k(i,j) − 1 ≥ 2,
Mjn+1(0)+2
N
Mjn+1(1)−1
N
2(1− ), if Sin,k(i,j) − 1 = 1.
(61)
REFERENCES
[1] D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine, The theory of learning in games. MIT press, 1998, vol. 2.
[2] S. Lasaulce and H. Tembine, Game theory and learning for wireless networks: fundamentals and applications. Academic
Press, 2011.
[3] W. Wang, A. Kwasinski, D. Niyato, and Z. Han, “A survey on applications of model-free strategy learning in cognitive
wireless networks,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 1717–1757, thirdquarter 2016.
[4] J. R. Marden, H. P. Young, and L. Y. Pao, “Achieving pareto optimality through distributed learning,” SIAM Journal on
Control and Optimization, vol. 52, no. 5, pp. 2753–2770, 2014.
[5] H. Young, “Learning by trial and error,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 626–643, 2009.
38
[6] M. Bennis, S. M. Perlaza, P. Blasco, Z. Han, and H. V. Poor, “Self-organization in small cell networks: A reinforcement
learning approach,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 12, no. 7, pp. 3202–3212, July 2013.
[7] S. M. Perlaza, H. Tembine, and S. Lasaulce, “How can ignorant but patient cognitive terminals learn their strategy and
utility?” in 2010 IEEE 11th International Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Communications (SPAWC),
June 2010, pp. 1–5.
[8] L. Rose, S. M. Perlaza, M. Debbah, and C. J. Le Martret, “Distributed power allocation with sinr constraints using trial and
error learning,” in 2012 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), April 2012, pp. 1835–1840.
[9] L. Rose, S. M. Perlaza, C. J. Le Martret, and M. Debbah, “Self-organization in decentralized networks: A trial and error
learning approach,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 268–279, January 2014.
[10] M. Sheng, C. Xu, X. Wang, Y. Zhang, W. Han, and J. Li, “Utility-based resource allocation for multi-channel decentralized
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Communications, vol. 62, no. 10, pp. 3610–3620, Oct 2014.
[11] L. Rose, S. M. Perlaza, C. J. Le Martret, and M. Debbah, “Achieving pareto optimal equilibria in energy efficient clustered
ad hoc networks,” in 2013 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), June 2013, pp. 1491–1495.
[12] B. S. Pradelski and H. P. Young, “Learning efficient nash equilibria in distributed systems,” Games and Economic behavior,
vol. 75, no. 2, pp. 882–897, July 2012.
[13] M. Simsek, M. Bennis, and A. Czylwik, “Dynamic inter-cell interference coordination in hetnets: A reinforcement learning
approach,” in 2012 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), Dec 2012, pp. 5446–5450.
[14] J. G. Kemeny, “Generalization of a fundamental matrix,” Linear Algebra and its Applications, vol. 38, no. Supplement
C, pp. 193 – 206, 1981. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0024379581900203
[15] J. G. Kemeny, J. L. Snell et al., Finite markov chains. van Nostrand Princeton, NJ, 1960, vol. 356.
[16] H. P. Young, “The evolution of conventions,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pp. 57–84, March 1993.
[17] L. Comtet, “Partitions of integers,” in Advanced Combinatorics. Springer, 1974, pp. 94–126.
[18] D. E. Knuth, “Generating all combinations and partitions,” in The Art of Computer Programming, Volume 4, Fascicle 3.
Addison-Wesley, July, 2005.
